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Abstract—The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) marketplace has
continued to expand in recent years. Although a few ma-
jor providers dominate (e.g. AWS, Google Cloud, Microsoft
Azure), there are also a number of specialist providers offering
hosting services and computing platforms1. A single Cloud
provider can also offer a marketplace for their own offerings –
e.g. the AWS Marketplace2, which enables third party libraries
to be deployed as services within AWS instances. In order to
determine whether a particular CSP should be used, clients
need to apply preliminary assessment and evaluation when
provisioning services on such a provider. Service selection
can be realised based on different decision-making criteria, to
enable a more informed selection process for clients. Trust can
be utilised as a mechanism to inform such selection decisions.
Trust can have different representations and utilise parameters
derived from past interactions. Trust therefore represents an
expression of risk associated with a service exchange between
clients and providers. We present a trust-based risk evaluation
for CSP selection in federated clouds, with a particular focus
on security & data privacy. We use a scenario from an
Architecture, Engineering & Construction (AEC) project to
demonstrate how such a selection can be made, and is of
benefit in developing the federated system. A methodology
for the selection process is outlined, making use of metrics
and certification processes from the Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA). The proposed approach can also be generalised to other
application domains with similar requirements.
1. Introduction
Combining capability & capacity from multiple Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) is a common requirement across
many industry projects. Understanding when and how ca-
pability (both infrastructure and services) can be combined
across multiple (independent) providers enables: (i) aggre-
gation of services that are difficult to provision locally by
one CSP; (ii) access to computing infrastructure (storage,
compute) that can be used on-demand; (iii) cost efficiency in
using and releasing infrastructure on-demand. However, de-
termining which CSP to include within a federation remains
1. CloudHarmony reports 90 providers: https://cloudharmony.com/
directory
2. https://aws.amazon.com/marketplace
a challenge, particularly when multiple CSPs are available
offering similar capabilities. Federation of cloud systems has
provided a common framework for providers to exchange
data and collaborate by connecting their local infrastructure.
The supporting mechanisms for cloud federation can bring
considerable value for clients by offering them low cost
access to global services which otherwise induces higher
costs for establishing new infrastructure (which is needed for
peak workloads over short time frames and remains unused
for most of the time).A federated cloud also allows users
to host applications with cloud provider of their choice.
This enables users to make local decisions about software
libraries/ systems, pricing and deployment environments,
while still remaining connected to other computational re-
sources. Through federation, it is also possible for an orga-
nization to run specific parts of their business functions on
different platforms, e.g. ERM, Human Resources, Marketing
etc can each be hosted on independently managed CSPs
(including in-house systems). Numerous cloud bridging so-
lutions now exist in market, like IBM’s Cast Iron Cloud
Integration [1], which is a part of Web Sphere suite of
tools used across various environments in development and
deployment of applications. Though the use of different
plugins, Cast Iron enables integration with a number of IBM
products (such as DB2) and systems from different vendors,
such as SAP and Salesforces CRM – hence enabling an
integration between in-house systems and public and private
Cloud environments [3]. Similar bridging platforms are also
available from other vendors, e.g. Oracle Cloud Machine
(which can be hosted at customer premises and which can be
connected to an external data center). However, a lot of these
systems are proprietary to their respective vendors. For this
reason these systems are quite inflexible to be customised
for a particular use-case scenario. CometCloud [4] is an
open source solution that has its validation from working
in numerous financial and scientific scenarios. CometCloud
has proven to work along specialist computing environments
(such as in case of large scale compute clusters within US
TeraGrid and XSEDE projects) and public Cloud systems
from Amazon. (described in section 1.1) [2].
1.1. Cloud Bridging & Federation
In construction projects, numerous companies are
brought together to collaborate over the life-cycle of the
building construction using different systems and storage
solutions. As part of this collaboration, access control,
authorization and privacy of various data objects created
during the entire life-cycle is critical to the successful
realization of the project along with their compatibility.
Currently, coordination between collaborators is a rigorous
manual procedure and requires a monopoly of software
systems to be enforced. In this work we consider a case
study of Clouds-4-Coordination system, a federated cross-
cloud space that has been built for coordination among
multi-site construction projects through the use of Virtual
Enterprise (VE) concept. Recently, the projects in Architec-
ture/Engineering/Construction (AEC) industry are increas-
ingly being undertaken by consortia of companies and in-
dividuals that collaboratively work for the entire project
duration. Such kind of projects are inherently complex and
its participants have to put different levels of skill to use in
the project from its beginning to the end. In the meanwhile,
different data artifacts are also produced which needs to be
stored and shared between these participants.
We describe the use of a Cooperation Threshold Estima-
tion (CTE) when using a new CSP in a collaborative project,
illustrated using a scenario in the Clouds-4-Coordination
federated cloud system. CTE for a project in any given
context is based on: i) perceived risk; ii) perceived com-
petence, at a point in time or over a time window; and
iii) Importance attached to collaborating. These parameters
influence the choice of using an external CSP, comparing
the risk vs. benefits in the context of a particular capability
(e.g. access to storage, execution of a particular service
instance, etc). The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, the requirements for trust based selection are
discussed. In Section 3, the cooperative threshold estimation
is presented. Methodology is presented in Section 4, and the
trust evaluation in Section 5. Conclusions are presented in
Section 6.
2. Trust-based Provider Selection
Trust is a complex phenomenon and has always been
investigated in varying contexts for various application do-
mains and research disciplines [5], [6]. There have been
many definitions of trust, notably in the context of phi-
losophy [10], sociology [7], [8], [9], , psychology [12],
[13] economics [11] and organizational management [15]
etc. However, trust in an entity has always been used as
a decision-making measure, and as a method to measure
the extent to which an entity (e.g. a CSP) will behave as
expected. As a foundation of our proposed research, trust is
a factor of: (i) Expectation: the trustee is going to present a
specific behavior in a certain way; (ii) Belief: the likelihood
at which the expected behavior is certain to occur, as evident
from the trustees (past) performance; (iii) Risk: that belief
in trustee is worth a risk for some specific purpose. Given
a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) x the trust T is the result
of expectation resulting from its positive ‘ρ’ or negative ‘η’
behavior with a certainty ′c′ and initial expectation ′a′, and
is given by: T = ρ+(1− c)×a, where ‘ρ’, ‘η’, c and a are
the result of attribute assessment and verification offered by
a CSP. Trust can be calculated using a variety of different
performance and operational metrics. Based on requirements
of AEC projects, where security and data privacy are often
key requirements within a consortium, in this work we
base this trust assessment on “Security, Trust and Assurance
Registry” (STAR) program by the Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA). The STAR program is used to support different
levels of assessment and certification of CSPs, to enable
Cloud Service Users (CSUs) make informed assessment of
CSP security capability and maturity.
2.1. Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) STAR Program
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has proposed a “Se-
curity, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR)” program [16]
aiming to increase transparency in an attribute-based assess-
ment of CSPs. As a part of this program, the Consensus
Assessment Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) is provided for
CSPs to offer security control transparency. CSA STAR
offers a three level assessment and certification program
with a free publicly accessible STAR database containing
assessment data for more than 200 CSPs.
At the first level, CSPs publish self-assessments of their
security controls, in CAIQ format, which is built upon
the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) framework. This self
assessment may afterwards be followed by an indepen-
dent third party audit for security control attestation and
certification of a CSP at level two. The third level for
continuous monitoring based certification is currently under
development [16], ensuring that the assessment can be made
on a continuous basis. CSA STAR continuous monitoring
enables automation of current security practices, requiring
CSPs to publish their security practices according to CSA
specifications. Customers and tool vendors can then retrieve
and analyse this data for use in a variety of contexts.
2.2. Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) & Consensus
Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ)
The Cloud Security Alliance CCM provides a control
framework for assessing security capability, providing guid-
ance across 16 domains. These controls enable CSPs to
report on their security capability in a way that can be
attested (verified) by external organisations, using a series
of questions that are captured in the CAIQ. The founda-
tions of CCM also relate to other industry-accepted security
standards and control frameworks, e.g. ISO 27001/27002,
ISACA, COBIT, PCI, NIST, Jericho Forum and NERC CIP.
As a framework, the CCM provides organizations with the
needed structure, detail and clarity relating to information
security tailored to the cloud industry. Cloud providers can
use the CAIQ to outline their security capabilities to cus-
tomers, publicly or privately, in a standardized way. How-
ever, the information offered is a CSP’s self -assessment;
cloud users may want assessments performed by some in-
dependent third-party organization.
2.3. Clouds-4-Coordination federation
In the Cloud-4-Coordination context multiple organiza-
tions participate to the realization of a construction project.
A construction project is a complicated activity usually
involving multiple diverse professions and organizations.
These organizations range from Small and Medium Enter-
prises (SMEs) to large multinational corporations. These or-
ganizations usually participate in the construction project for
different timeframes, and in the meanwhile, they contribute
variable amounts and types of data, or sometimes no data at
all, to the project. In such a context, the federation is used
to enable collaboration between designers, suppliers and
facilities managers for a range of design and construction
tasks. Each of these disciplines join the project framework
(realised using the CometCloud system) by sharing their
data from their own data center or cloud.
They key challenge in the Clouds-4-Coordination project
is the creation and management of the federation space
through CometCloud, where discipline specific service
providers can join and leave at any moment of time during
the project lifetime without any preliminary evaluation (i.e.
assessment of their trust). The process of enabling a new
discipline to join the federation has risks implications which
need to be mitigated in order to prevent project failure. This
is achieved by using a trust-based risk assessment, where
each discipline service provider is evaluated based on a
“’Cooperation Threshold Estimation” (CTE) to determine
the extent to which a discipline service provider can join a
project and the benefits it can offer.
In the Clouds-4-Coordination federation, we consider
that each site participating in the project must support a
local cloud environment. Each discipline has a CometCloud
deployment with one master (agent) and several workers,
where masters receive project tasks from other disciplines
and workers execute tasks and return results to local masters.
Each master locally hosts a project model formed of Industry
Foundation Classes (IFC) objects, a data format used in
the engineering and construction sector. The coordination
mechanism in the Clouds-4-Coordination system is based on
propagating events to the relevant discipline, i.e. disciplines
participating in the project are notified when a new project
is created. When a project creation notification is circulated,
a master retrieves and updates the project and then creates
a new version of the project on the local cloud. The entire
federation is managed by a “Federation Manager” (FedMgr)
which is in fact the owner of the project (i.e. client), iden-
tifying the organization that creates the project and which
can always retrieve the latest version of the project.
A key stage of the Clouds-4-Coordination process is
when a new discipline is added to the project and to the
federation. Here, the FedMgr (coordinator) starts the trust
evaluation of the new discipline and evaluates the ’Cooper-
ation Threshold Estimation’ metric. The methodology em-
ployed for trust based evaluation and selection is presented
in Section 3 and Section 4.
3. Cooperation Threshold Estimation
The Cooperation Threshold Estimation (CTE) approach
is used to determine the extent to which a CSP x is useful
to the Project ‘α’ in a given context c. Anticipated project
Cooperation Threshold (CT), as evaluated by FedMgr, is
given by:
CT (x, α, c) =
c∑
i
(
Perceived Risk(x, α, c)
Perceived Competence(x, c) + T (x, c)
×I(x, α, c))
(1)
Where Perceived Risk(x, α, c) is the overall risk as-
sessment by a client, Perceived Competence (PC) is based
on performance metrics of the given CSP ‘x’. This PC
is calculated by FedMgr along with T (x, c) as being an
aggregate result of any previous competence evaluations, if
any, thus formulating a ‘CSP Profile’. In the above equation
I(x, α, c) is the importance of collaboration as anticipated
by the disciplines participating in the project ′α′ in a given
context ‘c’. The above equation also holds true in case of
no context or a generic context involving all perspectives of
collaboration.
3.1. Entities
A number of entities as illustrated in Figure 1 are
involved in our proposed CTE approach for multi-site
construction projects employing cloud federation:
AEC Organizations: An AEC project is a complicated
activity usually involving multiple diverse professions
and firms (such as architects, engineering, structural,
mechanical, electrical, facilities management etc.). These
firms range from small companies offering specialist
expertise to large multinational companies offering multiple
expertise. Each one of these organization will participate
in a particular project for a varying time period and, in
that time period, will contribute different quantities and
types of data to the project. This data may be hosted within
an a private Cloud, or in some instances, capacity from a
multiple Cloud provider may be used. Increasingly, multiple
data sources/ locations are involved, requiring support for
merging and federation of data sets (representing different
parts of a Building Information Model (realised as IFC
classes)). This is the key focus of the Cloud-4-Coordination
project, which enables such federation to be realized using
the CometCloud system.
FedMgr: this is a trust-aware discipline that acts as
an overall coordinator for a project. It is responsible for
starting the federation process across the various data
sources that are involved in the project. This entity also
implements the CTE approach and uses data from multiple
CSPs involved. If a new CSP is to be included in the
federation, it has to be confirmed by the FedMgr.
Certification sources (Cloud Security Alliance / ENISA):
Recommendations and strategies from Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) and the European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA) are included and used as a part
of this research. CSA offers the CAIQ/CCM framework
for cloud security assessment, auditing and certification as
a program named CSA STAR mentioned in section 2.2.
ENISA offer risk assessment mechanism and strategies
for cloud users and businesses that wants to opt for cloud
computing solutions for their organizations.
Project User: this refers to the entity responsible for either:
(i) identifying the requirements for the project (i.e. the types
of capabilities that need to be supported); (ii) carrying out
operational management of the AEC project; (iii) managing
interactions across the various entities involve in an AEC
project.
4. Methodology
The FedMgr (described in section 3.1) is responsible
for calculating the CTE score, and illustrated in Figure
1. To become eligible for participating in the federation,
a CSP must possess a valid set of CAIQ assessments,
based on criteria identified by CSA, along with requisite
certification on these criteria. A one-time event at the start
of its participation is to provide its CAIQ assessment to
the FedMgr. This CAIQ assessment is parsed by the
Trust Representation process to get trust metric required by
Trust Evaluation function. The Trust Evaluation function is
responsible to evaluate a numerical representation of the
competence of the given CSP and to store the same in
repository to further evaluate the Cooperation Threshold. As
further illustrated in Figure 1, the project owner, whether an
individual or an organization, is responsible for initiating the
start of federation. Afterwards, more disciplines are added
to the shared Project Collaboration Space (PCS) based on
their Cooperation Threshold as estimated by the FedMgr.
Whenever there is a requirement to add a new discipline to
the project, an add new discipline request is forwarded to
the FedMgr, with the requisite trust criteria. A list of
qualifying CSPs matching this criteria is forwarded to the
PCS, where further action regarding the final selection of
CSP can be taken according to the project profile. Any CSP
x selected from this list is forwarded to FedMgr which in
turn initiates the requisite process to engage the given CSP
with the federation.
4.1. CSP Profiling
A CSP profile is a consolidated view of the trust and
competence of a given CSP registered with the FedMgr.
Initially, when a CSP joins the federation and has no per-
formance history available, its profile is only based on a
perceived risk as a result of CAIQ assessment and the level
of certification achieved by the CSP collectively known as
its trust posture:
perceived risk ∝ 1
trust posture
; (2)
Hence, trust posture reflects a CSPs ability to conform
to Cloud Security Alliance certification and must always
be specific to the context of a collaboration. For example,
engaging a particular CSP in the federation as a storage
repository requres that this CSP only be evaluated from
CAIQ controls relevant to storage, instead of all controls.
In this way, we can limit CAIQ controls that are relevant
for this specific service provision.
4.2. CSP Trust Posture
Our proposed method provides fine-grained and context
specific trust values based on CAIQ and CCM by CSA.
For trust evaluation, each control domain in CAIQ is repre-
sented as an opinion of CSP towards its security practices
and is modeled as a subjective belief (beta distribution
and Dempster-Shafer belief theory [19]). This opinion is
a collective view of CSPs positive and negative answers to
assertions of CAIQ hence known as declaration. Consid-
ering a generic context in which no domain specification
is provided for a collaboration, given p, q, un and NA as
the total number of positive, negative, unanswered and not
applicable declarations respectively and N = (p+ q + un)
as the total number of declarations that are applicable in any
given context, the trust of a CSP can be evaluated as:
T (λ, γ, ϕ, ) = λ+ ϕ ∗  (3)
given
λ = ρ ∗ ζ; γ = η ∗ ζ;ϕ = 1− ζ; (4)
ρ =
p
p+ q
; η =
q
p+ q
; ζ =
N ∗ (p+ q)
2 ∗ (N − p− q) +N ∗ (p+ q) ; (5)
In (5) λ is the belief, γ is the disbelief and ϕ is the
uncertainty of the behavior associated with a CSP. ρ is the
average positiveness and η is the average negativeness of
a security domain observed from CSA data. Both ρ and η
are calculated on the basis of p and q for each domain. A
control domain is said to have zero trust value given p +
q = 0. Confidence, ζ, is calculated based on N, p and q,
given N = (p + q + un) and initial expectation  = 0.99
for optimistic scenarios. The overall trust T of a CSP is
the average opinion of all domains selected for any given
transaction.
TABLE 1. INDIVIDUAL TRUST REPRESENTATION OF FIVE CSPS
CSP N p q un λ γ ϕ T
S 272 228 44 0 0.8382 0.1618 0 0.8864
A 290 208 82 0 0.7172 0.2828 0 0.7172
B 295 211 31 53 0.8706 0.1279 0.0015 0.8721
C 257 110 85 62 0.5627 0.4348 0.0025 0.5652
Q 251 202 22 27 0.9009 0.0981 0.0010 0.9019
In order to elaborate the concept, consider CSPs S, A,
B, C and Q having N, p, q and un as specified in Table 1.
This data regarding N, p, q and un is the result of numerical
representation the CAIQ information of five random CSPs
from the CSA STAR database. The values associated with
p and q corresponds to the total number of positive and
Figure 1. Cooperation Threshold Estimation Methodology
Figure 2. Representation of individual trust values of CSPs
negative assertions that these CSPs have answered. The
numbers relating to un are those assertions that were left
unanwsered by the CSPs. Afterwards, these three values
are aggregated as the total number of applicable assertions
N . A three dimensional graphical illustration of these trust
parameters for individual CSPs is presented in Figure 2.
Belief is represented on X-axis, disbelief on Y-axis and
uncertainty on Z-axis. Among these representative CSPs,
Q is top rated as having the maximum trust value.
5. Context specific trust evaluation
The relationship between CCM and CAIQ can be used
to evaluate trust based on two different types of contexts as
given below.
Business context:. A seperation of CAIQ assessment
on the basis of control domains. There are a total of 16
control domains as defined in CCM and illustrated in Table
2. Each control domain has its respective number of controls
and control assertions. This information allows the trust
management system to deliver a context specific trust eval-
uation when a CSP is interested in providing declarations
to fewer control assertions.
TABLE 2. NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION OF ASSERTIONS
No. ID Control Domain Controls Assertions
(16) (133) (295)
1 AIS Application & Interface Security 4 9
2 AAC Audit Assurance & Compliance 3 13
3 BCR Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience 11 22
4 CCC Change Control & Configuration Management 5 10
5 DSI Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management 7 17
6 DCS Datacenter Security 9 11
7 EKM Encryption & Key Management 4 14
8 GRM Governance and Risk Management 11 22
9 HRS Human Resources 11 24
10 IAM Identity & Access Management 13 40
11 IVS Infrastructure & Virtualization Security 13 33
12 IPY Interoperability & Portability 5 8
13 MOS Mobile Security 20 29
14 SEF Security Incident Management, E-Discovery, & Cloud Forensics 5 13
15 STA Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and Accountability 9 20
16 TVM Threat and Vulnerability Management 3 10
For example, consider that the stakeholders for a specific
project are only interested in AIS, AAC, GRM, IAM and
STA control domains. For a CSP x registered with CSA
STAR repository and willing to join the federation the
complete phenomena of trust posture derivation is depicted
in Table 3.
TABLE 3. NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION OF ASSERTIONS
N p q un ρ η c λ γ φ T compliance scale
AIS 9 5 4 0 0.5556 0.4444 1 0.5556 0.4444 0 0.5556 No
AAC 13 10 3 0 0.7692 0.2308 1 0.7692 0.2308 0 0.7692 Sufficient
GRM 22 19 3 0 0.8636 0.1364 1 0.8636 0.1364 0 0.8636 Full
IAM 40 25 15 0 0.625 0.375 1 0.625 0.375 0 0.625 Critical
STA 20 20 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 Full
Aggregate 104 79 25 0 0.7627 0.2373 1 0.7627 0.2373 0 0.7627 Sufficient
As given in Table 3, the trust values for a CSP based
on a given context can be evaluated from the assertions
relating only to applicable controls. These values in Table
3 are also a result of representing CAIQ information of
a random CSP from CSA STAR database. Considering
an applicable control GRM from the above example and
referring to Table 2, the total number of assertions in the
GRM domain are 22, out of which the CSP has positive
and negative declarations of 19 and 3 respectively. The
overall trust values T of any given domain is shown to be
converted to a compliance scale that may be derived from
the risk analysis of the project done by the stakeholders
(in this scenario, these are other disciplines involved in
the project). For example, the compliance of CSP x as in
Table 3 is based on a scale with a baseline trust of 0.6,
giving us a critical threshold value of 0.6-0.7, Sufficient
0.7-0.8 and Full compliance of 0.8-1.0. In case of qualifying
CSPs being more than one, with trust values greater than a
given threshold, a comparison is to be made on the basis of
similar control domains and compliance scale. Afterwards
the trust posture of the given CSP is function of aggregated
compliance and the certification level as given by CSA.
The mapping of CCM and CAIQ gives us the number
of controls and assertions applicable in case of any given
resource, and can be considered in a specific context or for
all capabilities of a cloud provider. For example, considering
a project requiring storage for its consumers, the only con-
trols and assertion applicable in such a case can be observed
from Table 4 i.e. 89 and 253 out of a total of 133 controls
and 295 assertions. The applicable assertions are evaluated
for trust the same way as mentioned in the above section.
TABLE 4. NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION OF ASSERTIONS
Cont ID. P(158) N(194) C(226) S(253) A(240) D(225)
AIS 2 4 9 9 9 9
AAC 13 13 13 13 13 13
BCR 16 15 17 12 16 17
CCC 2 1 10 17 10 9
DSI 0 2 14 15 15 17
DCS 11 4 4 10 3 3
EKM 0 10 4 15 10 14
GRM 10 10 9 5 12 12
HRS 17 14 14 14 19 22
IAM 20 33 37 12 38 28
IVS 23 29 33 14 25 28
IPY 2 8 4 37 6 6
MOS 9 8 15 28 21 12
SEF 13 13 13 6 13 13
STA 20 20 20 5 20 20
TVM 0 10 10 13 10 2
Whereas in Table 4, P, N, C, S, A and D, refers to
Physical, Network, Compute, Storage, Application and Data
respectively as given by CCM. Given that a project is in need
of more than one type of resource but not all, we may use an
OR relationship. Conversely, in strict cases this relationship
may change to AND relationship between assertions i.e. all
required resources must qualify for compliance in matching
controls. A similar method for trust evaluation in resource
context is used as described for the business context.
6. Conclusions
Trust based risk assessment in federated clouds can
limit provider lock-in, and enable access to a variety of
different CSPs. This is a key requirement for establishing
and sustaining a Cloud marketplace, enabling a range of
different platforms and service providers to co-exist. We
demonstrate how such trust evaluation can be realized based
on (i) perceived risk; (ii) perceived competence, and the
(iii) importance of engaging in collaboration. We present the
findings of our study in the context of an existing Clouds-
4-Coordination project (focusing on Civil Engineering/AEC
sector), where the overall assessment of trust can have
significant cost implications for a project. Determining risk
associated with a provider as a perceived risk can inform the
process of provider selection and can prevent possible delays
in a project. The certification process used by Cloud Security
Alliance is used as a basis for establishing ”trust” and
used to determine whether a new CSP should be included
within a Cloud federation. We conduct our evaluation by
utilizing trust representation from five domains (as identified
by Cloud Security Alliance) and emphasize what criterion
are relevant when using trust to inform risk assessment of
service providers.
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